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mercial Code § 10-101. During the period in which the transactions took
place, Section 5 of the Banking Collection Code was the applicable law. Thus,
if the court were citing the Code as the controlling law, it was in error. How-
ever, the court may well have been adopting the provisions of Section 4-202
to supplement the rule of Section 5 of the Banking Collection Code; the
former says, in essence, the same as the latter, except in more detail.
S.H.G.
ARTICLE 9: SECURED TRANSACTIONS
SECTION 9-102. Policy and Scope of Article
IN THE MATTER OF UNITED THRIFT STORES, INC.
242 F. Supp. 714 (D.N.J. 1965)
Redisco, Inc., financing agent for a manufacturer of home appliances,
filed a financing statement with the Secretary of State of New Jersey cover-
ing appliances that were to be delivered to United Thrift Stores, Inc. (Thrift),
a distributor. Thereafter, Redisco, Thrift and the manufacturer entered into
four separate but identical agreements, each containing the following sections:
(1) A bill of sale from the manufacturer to Redisco; (2) a promissory note
from Thrift to Redisco; and (3) a trust receipt from Thrift to Redisco. The
release amount of the trust receipts was fixed at the full amount of the
promissory notes, and the terms of payment were set at ninety days or one-
third at thirty, sixty and ninety days. Shortly after the execution of the four
agreements, Thrift filed a Chapter XI petition in bankruptcy. Redisco, in
turn, filed a petition for reclamation of the appliances, which the referee de-
nied.
The district court reversed and held that Redisco had a valid security
interest in the appliances and was thus entitled to reclamation. In reaching
this result the court first decided that the trust receipts had created a valid
security interest under Sections 1-201(37), 9-102(1) (a) and -102(2), and
had met the requirements for a valid security agreement under Sections 9-
105(1) (h), -201 and -203(1) (b). It then found that the financing statement
was correctly filed under Section 9-401 and that the security interest had at-
tached under Section 9-204(1) "when the agreements were made, value was
given, and United Thrift received possession of the collateral."
The trustee contended that the security interest had not been perfected
because the agreements had not been executed prior to the filing of the financ-
ing statement. The court, however, held otherwise, citing Sections 9-303(1)
and -402(1) which provide that the steps for perfection may be taken prior
to attachment and in such a case, perfection occurs on attachment. The court
then concluded that because of Thrift's default, Redisco was entitled to re-
possession of the collateral or the proceeds thereof under Sections 9-306 and
-503 and, because the perfection had preceded the bankruptcy, Redisco had
priority over the trustee.
In a separate argument, the court also rejected the referee's argument
that the terms of payment indicated that the sale had been on open account,
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holding instead that the terms were not necessarily indicative of an open ac-
count and, moreover, under Sections 9-203(1)(b) and -205, they did not
negative an intent to enter into a secured transaction.
SECTION 9-105. Definitions and the Index of Definitions
IN THE MATTER OF UNITED THRIFT STORES, INC.
242 F. Supp. 714 (D.N.J. 1965)
Annotated under Section 9-102, supra.
SECTION 9-201. General Validity of Security Agreement
IN THE MATTER OF UNITED THRIFT STORES, INC.
242 F. Supp. 714 (D.N.J. 1965)
Annotated under Section 9-102, supra.
UNITED STATES V. LEBANON WOOLEN MILLS CORP.
241 F. Supp. 393 (D.N.H. 1965)
See Comment, infra p. 366.
SECTION 9-203. Enforceability of Security Interest; Proceeds,
Formal Requisites
IN THE MATTER OF UNITED THRIFT STORES, INC.
242 F. Supp. 714 (D.N.J. 1965)
Annotated under Section 9-102, supra.
SECTION 9-204. When Security Interest Attaches; After-Acquired
Property; Future Advances
BLANCOB CONSTR. CORP. V. 246 BEAUMONT EQUITY, INC.
261 N.Y.S.2d 227 (App. Div. 1965)
The defendant was the assignee of a conditional sales contract under
which a heating boiler, an oil burner and a storage tank were installed in an
apartment building which had been mortgaged to the plaintiff. The mortgage
contained a standard after-acquired property clause. Without obtaining the
plaintiff's consent, the defendant's assignor removed the old heating equip-
ment when it installed the new unit.
Plaintiff brought this action to foreclose its mortgage, and asserted pri-
ority to the new heating unit by virtue of the after-acquired property clause.
The parties stipulated that the heating unit was personal property. The
lower court refused to grant plaintiff's motion for a summary judgment and
the appellate court affirmed, holding that plaintiff had failed to present facts
and details indicating that "defendant's title should be subordinated to the
lien of plaintiff's mortgage."
While discussing the substantive issues, the court stated, as the general
rule; that a conditional sales agreement establishes a lien on fixtures superior
to that of an after-acquired property clause of a mortgage. The court, citing
Sections 9-108, -204 and -303, noted that although the Code was not in effect
at the time of this case, the rule would seem to be the same under the Code.
S.H.G.
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Plaintiff contended that, notwithstanding the general rule, defendant's
lien should be subordinated to its lien since defendant had removed the old
equipment without the plaintiff's consent. The court rejected this argument
on the ground that the plaintiff's proper remedy was a suit against the de-
fendant to recover the value of the old equipment and the damages to the
building caused by the removal of the new equipment.
COMMENT
The court cited Sections 9-108, -204, and -303 in support of the proposi-
tion that "the title of a conditional vendor to removable fixtures installed
upon realty was superior to the lien of a prior mortgage containing the
standard 'after-acquired' property clause." This was stated as a general propo-
sition of law. However, finer distinctions would have to be made were this
case decided under the Code.
Basically, in determining priority it would be important to distinguish
between personal property and fixtures. if the heating equipment were, as
the parties stipulated, personal property, then under Section 9-312(4) the
defendant's purchase money security interest would prevail only if he per-
fected his security interest under Section 9-303 prior to the debtor's possession
of the collateral or within ten days thereafter. Conversely, if the heating equip-
ment were designated a fixture, then under Section 9-313(2) the defendant
would prevail over the mortgagee if its security interest attached to the equip-
ment pursuant to Section 9-204 before the equipment was affixed to the realty.
S.H.G.
IN THE MATTER OF UNITED THRIFT STORES, INC.
242 F. Supp. 714 (D.N.J. 1965)
Annotated under Section 9-102, supra.
SECTION 9-205. Use or Disposition of Collateral Without
Accounting Permissible
IN THE MATTER OF UNITED THRIFT STORES, INC.
242 F. Supp. 714 (D.N.J. 1965)
Annotated under Section 9-102, supra.
SECTION 9-303. When Security interest Is Perfected; Continuity
of Perfection
IN THE MATTER OF UNITED THRIFT STORES, INC.
242 F. Supp. 714 (D.N.J. 1965)
Annotated under Section 9-102, supra.
SECTION 9-306. "Proceeds"; Security Party's Rights on
Disposition of Collateral
IN THE MATTER OF UNITED THRIFT STORES, INC.
242 F. Supp. 714 (D.N.J. 1965)
Annotated under Section 9-102, supra.
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SECTION 9-313. Priority of Security Interests in Fixtures
BLANCOB CONSTR. CORP. V. 246 BEAUMONT EQUITY, INC.
261 N,Y.S.2d 227 (App. Div. 1965)
Annotated under Section 9-204, supra.
SECTION 9-318. Defenses Against Assignee; Modification of
Contract After Notification of Assignment;
Term Prohibiting Assignment Ineffective;
Identification and Proof of Assignment
HUDSON SUPPLY & EQUIP. CO . V. HOME FACTORS CORP.
210 A.2d 837 (D.C. Ct. App. 1965)
Defendant Hudson and the Eastern Brick & Tile Co. were reciprocally
indebted to one another as a result of sales transactions. The plaintiff, East-
ern's assignee of its accounts receivable due from the defendant, brought suit
"for the amount due under the accounts." In finding for the plaintiff, the lower
court rejected defendant's argument that its claims against Eastern should be
set off against plaintiff's claim. Rather, it concluded that the debt running
from Eastern to defendant was a matter for them to settle in a separate
action.
The court of appeals reversed, holding that since the defendant's claims
against Eastern had accrued prior to the assignment, they should have been
set off against the plaintiff's claim. Although the Code was not in effect at
the time of this transaction, the court, in a footnote, cited Section 9-318
"which makes the rights of an assignee generally subject to any defense or
claim of the account debtor against the assignor which accrues before the ac-
count debtor receives notification of the assignment."
G.F.P.
SECTION 9-401. Place of Filing; Erroneous Filing; Removal
of Collateral
IN THE MATTER OF UNITED THRIFT STORES, INC.
242 F. Supp. 714 (D.N.J. 1965)
Annotated under Section 9-102, supra.
SECTION 9-402. Formal Requisites of Financing Statement;
Amendments
BENEDICT V. LEBOWITZ
346 F.2d 120 (2d Cir. 1965)
Plaintiff delivered to Hargrove Typesetting Service certain equipment
under a chattel mortgage. To perfect his security interest in the equipment,
the plaintiff filed the chattel mortgage, a financing statement and a filing fee
with the Secretary of State. He did not formally sign the financing statement
in the space at the bottom reserved for the secured party's signature. He did,
however, have his secretary type his name into the body of the statement.
Hargrove was subsequently adjudicated a bankrupt. Plaintiff's reclamation
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petition was opposed on the ground that the financing statement had not
been signed, but the referee granted the petition and the district court agreed.
The circuit court affirmed, holding that under Section 9-402(1), a formal
signature was not required. Rather, under Section 1-201(39), a signature "in-
cludes any symbol executed or adopted . . . with present intention to au-
thenticate a writing." The court concluded that since the plaintiff had his
secretary type his name into the body of the statement and had subsequently
filed it, he had manifested the requisite intent. Support was found for this
in Section 1-102 which provides that the act should be liberally construed
and applied to facilitate the simplification, clarification and modernization
of the law governing commercial transactions.
The court also noted that under Section 9-402(5), a financing statement
in substantial compliance with the rest of the section would not be invalidated
by a minor error and implied that the lack of a formal signature in this fact
situation was a minor error.
S.H.G.
WILSHIRE OIL CO. v. COSTELLO
348 F.2d 241 (9th Cir. 1965)
Elliott Oil Co. assigned certain accounts receivable to Wilshire as security
on a debt. The notice of assignment was filed by Elliott at Wilshire's written
request but, while it contained the names of both parties, only Elliott had
signed it. Subsequently, Elliott filed a voluntary petition in bankruptcy. The
district court held that the trustee owned the accounts free and clear of Wil-
shire's claim because Sections 3018 and 3019 of the California Civil Code
required that the notice of assignment be signed by both the assignor and the
assignee. Wilshire appealed, contending that the statute was "directory"
rather than "mandatory" and that in any case there had been substantial
compliance with the filing provisions.
The court of appeals declared that the statute was mandatory and held
that the assignment was ineffective as against the trustee for want of proper
filing. While the Civil Code contained no explicit provision for "substantial
compliance," the court seemed to imply one, using Section 9-402(5) of the
Commercial Code as a model. It noted, however, that not even that minimal
standard had been met.
COMMENT
The sections of the Civil Code which controlled this case have since been
repealed and supplanted by the Uniform Commercial Code. It is unlikely
that the court could have reached this result had the Code controlled the
instant case. Concededly, Section 9-402(1) calls for the signatures of both
parties, but it is important to note that the purpose of this section, as ex-
pressed by Comment 2, is to "adopt the system of 'notice filing' . . . ." Inas-
much as the filing in this case contained all the pertinent information and
lacked only a signature, it is clear that it gave adequate notice of the as-
signment.
Beyond this, it could well be found that this filing satisfied the require-
ment of two signatures. Section 1-201(39) defines a signature as "any symbol
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executed or adopted by a party with present intention to authenticate a
writing." It was held in Benedict v. Lebowitz, 346 F.2d 120 (2d Cir. 1965),
annotated under this section, that where the intent to authenticate was other-
wise shown, the typewritten insertion of a party's name was a signature under
Sections 1-201(39) and -102. The court added in that case that the result
could have been supported by the substantial compliance provision of Section
9-402(5).
In dealing with the question of substantial compliance in the instant
case, however, the court adopted the defendant's argument that an assignee's
signature is required not for the purpose of giving notice but as authentica-
tion that an assignment has actually taken place. Defendant argued that this
two-signature requirement would prevent illusory and fraudulent assignments
by a debtor seeking to protect his accounts from creditors. While this may
have been a strong argument under the Civil Code, Comment 2 to Section
9-402 makes it clear that such authentication is not the intent of the Com-
mercial Code and that once notice is given, "further inquiry from the parties
concerned will be necessary to disclose the complete state of affairs."
G.F.P.
IN THE MATTER OF UNITED THRIFT STORES, INC.
242 F. Supp. 714 (D.N.J. 1965)
Annotated under Section 9-102, supra.
SECTION 9-503. Secured Party's Right to Take Possession
After Default
IN THE MATTER OF UNITED THRIFT STORES, INC.
242 F. Supp. 714 (D.N.J. 1965)
Annotated under Section 9-102, supra.
SECTION 9.504. Secured Party's Right to Dispose of Collateral
After Default; Effect of Disposition
ASSOCIATES DISCOUNT CORP. Y. CARY
262 N.Y.S.2d 646 (Civ. Ct. 1965)
The defendant Cary was a seaman who was repeatedly required to move
to various east coast cities. While in the District of Columbia, he bought an
automobile from the plaintiff's assignor under a conditional sales contract.
After having paid one-third of the installments, the defendant defaulted while
domiciled in Massachusetts, and, as a result, the plaintiff repossessed and re-
sold the automobile in that state. Pursuant to the terms of the contract and
in keeping with the governing law of the District of Columbia, the plaintiff con-
ducted the sale without first giving notice to the defendant. Since the proceeds
of the sale were insufficient to discharge the debt, this action for a deficiency
judgment was brought in New York, where the defendant was then residing.
The court dismissed the complaint and entered judgment for the de-
fendant. The New York rule concerning deficiency judgments is that "if the
repossession and resale are not in compliance with the law no suit for any
claimed deficiency will lie." In the instant case, there were two jurisdictions
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outside the forum with conflicting rules on the question of repossession and
resale, and it thus became necessary for the court to determine which body
of law would govern this transaction. In resolving this question, the court
decided that the District of Columbia law would apply to any controversy
regarding the validity or interpretation of the contract, but when a remedy
is sought in another state, namely Massachusetts, the remedy is controlled by
the law of that state. In Massachusetts, the governing law on this subject
is the Code. However, the question arose whether Massachusetts would apply
its own law or that of the District of Columbia. The court then turned to
Section 1-105 of the Code and concluded that Massachusetts would apply
its own law.
Under Section 9-504(3) of the Massachusetts Code, the secured party
must give notice to the debtor before the resale takes place. Since notice was
not given, "the repossession and resale . . . [were] not in compliance with
the [Massachusetts] law," and thus plaintiff was not entitled to a deficiency
judgment.
COMMENT
In declaring its basic proposition that no action for a deficiency judg-
ment would lie where the resale was not "in compliance with the law," the
court cited a line of cases which are grounded in Sections 79 and 80 of the
New York Personal Property Law. Under these cases, a creditor who has
received less than 50% of the purchase price can elect to keep the collateral
unless the debtor demands a resale. Compare, U .C.C. § 9-505. If he volun-
tarily sells the collateral without first giving notice to the debtor, the effect
will be the same as if the creditor has not sold the article—the debt will be
discharged and no action for a deficiency will lie. Mott v. Moldenhauer, 261
App. Div. 724, 27 N.Y.S.2d 563 (1941); Island Installment Corp. v. Panico,
37 Misc.2d 186, 233 N.Y.S.2d 812 (1962). It must be noted, however, that
under this line of cases the debtor is not entitled to recover damages from
the creditor for any loss incurred because of the creditor's failure to give no-
tice. See Ryan v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 248 App. Div. 668, 288
N.Y.S. 912 (1936).
After the present case was decided, New York adopted the Code and
thus repealed Sections 79 and 80 of the Personal Property Law. The question
thus arises whether the same result would be reached on these facts today.
Since the Code does not expressly make a deficiency judgment available
to a creditor who conducts a resale without giving notice to the debtor, it is
entirely possible that the New York courts will continue to follow this line
of cases and deny the creditor a deficiency judgment. Section 9-504(2) merely
provides that the debtor is liable for the deficiency, and subsection (3) im-
poses upon the creditor a duty of giving notice. Upon the face of it, then,
the Code contains nothing which would require the courts to abandon this
line of decisions. Moreover, Section 9-505 contains substantially the same
requirements as Sections 79 and 80 of the Personal Property Law with regard
to consumer goods. It would be entirely proper to use this section to support
this line of cases.
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Upon examination of Section 9-507(1), however, one finds that "if the
disposition has occurred the debtor . . . has a right to recover from the se-
cured party any loss caused by a failure to comply with the provisions of
this part." Furthermore, this subsection provides a penalty in the case of
consumer goods as "the debtor has a right to recover in any event an amount
not less than the credit service charge plus •ten per cent of the principal
amount of the debt or the time price differential plus ten per cent of the cash
price." Given the fact that the debtor has this right of recovery under the
Code, it would appear that he is now protected from the effects of such a
sale without notice, and there is thus no longer any reason to deny the defici-
ency judgment. On balance, therefore, it would seem that the more reasonable
course of action would be to protect both parties by giving the creditor his
deficiency judgment as limited by the damages to which the debtor is entitled
as a result of the improper sale.
G.F.P.
SECTION 9-507. Secured Party's Liability for Failure to
Comply With This Part
ASSOCIATED DISCOUNT CORP. V. CARY
262 N.Y.S.2d 646 (Civ. Ct. 1965)
Annotated under Section 9-504, supra.
301
-5+.Trma
